The proposals are part of each chamber’s version of the annual defense policy bill, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 2026.

According to the Senate Armed Services Committee’s version, DOD must conduct a study on force employment of cyber in support of combatant commands and evaluate establishing Joint Task Force-Cyber elements across those geographic combatant commands.

A proposal in the House, offered by Armed Services Subcommittee on Cyber, Innovative Technologies and Information Systems chairman Rep. Don Bacon, R-Neb., requires a similar evaluation, though focused specifically on the Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility.

According to Bacon, the military is not properly organized for the current cyber conflict.

“Since becoming Chairman of the Subcommittee, I’ve grown increasingly concerned that we are not correctly organized for the cyber fight we find ourselves in today, let alone a more complex and consequential future fight. Our Cyber Command does great working national threats, but I want to ensure our Cyber team is postured right for a potential fight with China over Taiwan,” he said in a statement.

He said he plans to push for the establishment of a Joint Task Force-Cyber — not merely an evaluation — when both chambers of Congress convene to reconcile their bills.

“If we accept the reality that we are already in hostilities with our principal adversary in cyberspace, then there is no time to waste,” Bacon said.

Bacon also pointed to the fact that this is not a new issue. In the fiscal 2023 NDAA, Congress required the creation of a similar organization — a Joint Task Force — in Indo-Pacom to support joint operations in the kinetic space before conflict, because the military was not sufficiently acting jointly, in lawmakers’ view.

Sources indicated that construct has worked well so far and these proposals could mirror that on the non-kinetic side.

Moreover, a classified DOD Inspector General report that examined the effectiveness of Indo-Pacom and Cyber Command’s planning for offensive cyberspace operations and Cybercom’s execution of offensive cyberspace ops in support of Indo-Pacom’s plans, recommended the creation of a Joint Task Force-Cyber, according to someone familiar. That examination began in 2023.

Congress has in several previous NDAAs asked for studies and evaluations on how Cybercom’s headquarters elements are organized and how it employs cyber capabilities effectively. Sources indicated these proposals are likely, in part, an indication that lawmakers aren’t pleased with either the responses from the Defense Department, or there has been a lack of response from DOD.

If realized, the creation of joint task forces for cyber at the combatant commands could potentially lead to a complete restructure for how operations are conducted, according to sources.

How cyber operations are conducted

Ultimately, these proposals could end up giving more oversight and control of cyber operations to the geographic combatant commanders.

Unlike the other domains of warfare, there still is no cyber component command at the geographic combatant commands. Each component command — land, air and maritime — is responsible for commanding and coordinating the forces under their domain on behalf of the four-star combatant commander, who has the ultimate authority on how and which forces are employed for particular operations.

Cyber, however, is different.

Since Cybercom established its cyber mission force over 10 years ago — the 147 teams that the services provide to Cybercom to conduct cyber operations — digital forces and capabilities are employed through what the command calls Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber.

These entities are commanded by the heads of the service cyber components and are assigned particular combatant commands to provide planning, targeting, intelligence, synchronization, and command and control of cyber capabilities.

Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber Army is responsible for Central Command, Africa Command and Northern Command. Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber Navy is responsible for Indo-Pacom, Southern Command and United States Forces Korea. Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber Air Force is responsible for European Command, Space Command and Transportation Command. Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber Marine Corps is responsible for Special Operations Command. DOD Cyber Defense Command, formerly Joint Force Headquarters-DOD Information Network, is the coordinating authority for Transportation Command.

None of the these entities were designed to be identical.

Moreover, there is also the Cyber National Mission Force, a sub-unified command under Cybercom, which is responsible for defending the nation against significant digital threats and is thought to possess the most elite cyber operators. It is a global entity aligned in task forces assigned to different threat actors, which means they are also operating within the areas of responsibility for geographic combatant commands.

Given Cyber National Mission Force’s global mission, the commander of Cybercom can conduct operations in a particular theater based on his priorities and mission sets. While this may be coordinated with the regional commander, they don’t necessarily have to ask for permission, in what could be seen by the geographic combatant commander as infringing on their area of operations.

The geographic combatant commanders don’t have as much control over cyber forces in their regions as they do for the physical or kinetic forces. The cyber teams are controlled by the JFHQ-Cs through Cybercom. Moreover, Cybercom has the ability to reorganize and realign forces around as they see fit against different priorities and threats, though, this is usually done in consultation with the combatant commands.

Cybercom, not the combatant commands themselves, approves the cyber operations for the regional commands, which includes interagency coordination.

Approvals for cyber ops flow through the commander of Cybercom, not the geographic combatant commands themselves, which includes interagency coordination.

Taken together, sources indicated these could all be seen as a loss of control for the geographic combatant commanders, who are responsible for running the operations in their regions and typically have oversight of their forces. Some have argued that the regional combatant commanders should have control and oversight of all the forces in their geography.

Sources indicated tensions exist in this construct with a regionally focused combatant command and a globally focused combatant command that has a high-demand, low-density asset in cyber.

“I think what you’re seeing is the tension that exists today between having Cybercom forces that really, at the end of the day, are controlled by the Cybercom commander in general support to the other Cocoms versus having that combatant commander have full control,” a former military cyber official told DefenseScoop.

Others indicated the creation of a joint task force is a natural evolution for the command and control of cyber forces.

Indo-Pacom, in particular, poses a unique challenge with all the cyber forces operating within its area of responsibility.

There are combat mission teams that conduct cyber operations on behalf of combatant commands, mostly in the offensive sphere, coordinated by Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber Navy, Joint Task Force-Ares — which initially was a counter-ISIS cyber task force but shifted four years ago to focus more on nation-states, particularly in the Pacific region — run by Marine Corps Force Cyberspace Command — as well as teams from the Cyber National Mission Force.

For those reasons, the command and control of these forces must be under a single chain of command. Those forces could be packaged together and work for the Indo-Pacom commander, the former officials posited when discussing a potential future scenario, and then the Indo-Pacom commander would have full control over them, a departure from the situation today.

For Indo-Pacom, everything is on island, a second former military cyber official said, meaning where their Hawaii headquarters are located. Indo-Pacom wants everyone on island with them so capabilities can be better integrated, they added.

Experts and former officials noted that a Joint Task Force-Cyber structure would likely clean up command and control lines for the employment of cyber.

Those that spoke to DefenseScoop noted combatant commands could see this as enhancing simplicity and speed.

In a future conflict, decisions will have to be made at unprecedented speeds, as seen in the Ukraine-Russia war.

However, the global nature of cyberspace and actors could complicate such an arrangement where the regional commander has more control.

China, for example, is a global threat actor and taking control from Cybercom could lessen its ability to surge or act in other regions. If there is a global threat versus a regional threat, officials would have to figure out what takes priority, who makes the decision and who has the authority to re-direct cyber forces to address them, a third former military cyber official posited.

Questions and resource constraints

Experts raised several issues that should be addressed with the potential formulation of joint task forces for cyber at the combatant commands, posing questions that should be answered in an evaluation for their necessity or creation.

One concern is whether the assessment for the creation of a Joint Task Force-Cyber is fair when balanced against what Cybercom has been doing over the last couple of years.

Cybercom has continued to reevaluate how it conducts cyber operations over the years.

Discussions in recent years inside the command have also focused on creating task forces that would be assigned against particular threat actors. This would potentially allow cyber forces to transcend the geographic boundaries given cyber threat actors are global.  

The drafting of this legislation, however, signals that the current processes can be done better.

Would a new process create more hurdles or would it enable greater simplicity?

“You have to ask yourself with what we’ve designed today, is it simple … Simplicity, speed, precision, clarity, these kind of things are really important in a fast fight for C2. And you could offer that’s not necessarily the case with the current design,” the first former official said. “Is the juice worth the squeeze?”

The third former official noted it’s important to ask what problem is this trying to solve? What is this a joint task force to do? Is this an authorities issue, is it a cyber mission force capacity issue, or what are the combatant commands not getting that they need from Cybercom?

Some of these issues could be wargamed or worked out through table top exercises, they noted.

For many officials, an education gap still exists where combatant commands still don’t always know how to employ the JFHQ-Cs or what to ask for from Cybercom. Some of this is relationship and personality based and can differ based on each organization.

About eight years ago, Cybercom began to create planning cells — Cyber Operations-Integrated Planning Elements (CO-IPEs) — located within the staffs of the geographic combatant commands to help them with synchronization and planning given the JFHQ-Cs are at remote locations.

While the CO-IPEs were designed to assist in planning and understanding how to employ cyber operations, they still haven’t all matured effectively to provide all the necessary answers and planning requested.

According to the third former official, some of the geographic combatant commands are probably saying, “I just don’t have the authority.”

They pushed back on that assessment, noting if the combatant commands asked for something, they’d likely get it, but an educational issue on both sides of the problem exists.

Another model could be to bolster the CO-IPEs to mirror Special Operations Command’s theater special operations commands (TSOCs), which are small teams and how special operations forces are employed in geographic combatant commands.

These entities can act as a connective tissue between seams in geographic regions and anticipate which threats may need more resources. They can provide command and control for running operations, if needed. CO-IPEs are currently only for planning and have no command and control functions.  

Another option could be to co-locate the cyber forces within the JTF within the combatant command. Currently, only the CO-IPE is embedded in the geographic combatant command staff. The JFHQ-C and cyber forces conducting the operations are at remote locations, not directly within the geographic combatant command they’re supporting.

But part of the challenge with the way the legislation is written is if Congress wants a Socom model, lawmakers would establish a TSOC equivalent for a Cybercom forward element or cyber element for forces in theater and not a Joint Task Force-Cyber, one of the former officials said. The reason that doesn’t exist today, they added, is the control is done in the rear of the CO-IPE and they conduct the integrated planning with the combatant command staff forward.

“I don’t think Cocom commanders are happy with that. I think they want the control,” the official suggested.

Other key questions surround resources. Oftentimes when there’s a new problem, organizations stand up a new headquarters, but nobody gets any more people, one of the former officials pointed out.

Of note, given each Joint Force Headquarters supports multiple combatant commands, in many cases officials within those organizations wear multiple hats. For example, a service cyber component might have an integrated operations staff that does everything for all their Joint Force Headquarters.

If each combatant command creates a Joint Task Force-Cyber and the Joint Force Headquarters go away — something that isn’t necessarily clear based on the legislation proposed — where do the new joint task force personnel come from? Are those staff that wore multiple hats ripped apart, some sources asked.

Setting priorities

One of the other aspect driving an assessment to create a new joint task force construct is to help drive more emphasis on the combatant command cyber forces and capabilities.

According to a congressional staffer, there was a sense that there was neglect for the combatant command-related cyber capabilities in favor of the Cyber National Mission Forces that defend the nation.

It comes down to prioritization and resources. The Cyber National Mission Force has a global mission and there is a lot of prioritization that goes to them, but that doesn’t mean the other teams aren’t working, former officials said.

With limited resources, what gets the focus? Are they things that are important to Cybercom or the geographic combatant commands, one former official asked, noting they could see an argument coming from a combatant command asking is Cybercom doing things that are of the most interest to that combatant commander or are they working on things that are of less interest to them, but of more interest to Cybercom, which are typically CNMF targets.

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The language appears in the SASC-passed version of the annual defense policy bill for fiscal 2026. While the committee approved the legislation last week, the full text was only released Wednesday.

Specifically, if it becomes law, the legislation would require a report from the Pentagon on the integration of reserve components, namely the National Guard, into the cyber mission force. It would also mandate an implementation plan.

The cyber mission force is comprised of 147 teams — including offensive, defensive and support teams — that the military services provide to U.S. Cyber Command to employ for operations.

Guard units have been used to support or supplement active units in various capacities. In fact, at the outset and creation of the cyber mission force nearly 15 years ago, the Air Force decided to initially take a total force approach to build its contribution, meaning its teams were made up of a mix of active component and Guard members.

Other assistance, most notably, includes Task Force Echo, the biggest Guard cyber mobilization to date with soldiers from 32 states having supported it over a number of years.

Little public information is known about the task force other than it aids full-spectrum cyber operations for Cybercom’s Cyber National Mission Force. While not so-called “trigger pullers,” sources have also indicated the task force provides infrastructure support.

The Guard has also conducted experiments with Cybercom in years past to test what was called the Cyber 9-Line, a tool that allows participating Guard units from their respective states to quickly share incidents with the Cyber National Mission Force, which can provide analysis of discovered malware and offer feedback to the states to help redress the incident, while also potentially taking action against the threat outside U.S. borders.

The Senate Armed Services Committee’s fiscal 2026 policy bill would require a report that provides an assessment of different authorities in each status of the reserve components, with particular focus on the National Guard and authorities under title 32, and how the DOD can use those personnel in such statuses within the cyber mission force.

It should also include an analysis of current and planned efforts to work with the military departments, the National Guard and the adjutants general of each state to develop unique cyber capabilities that address identified operational requirements — and a description of methods to work with those entities to track and identify key skills and competencies that aren’t part of primary military occupational specialties.

Moreover, senators want to see an evaluation of what types of authorities would be most beneficial to maximize the activation and support of the reserve components to cyber operations as well as an evaluation of the existing barriers to or impediments for integration of the reserve components into the cyber mission force.

The Guard has been lauded as an under-tapped and potentially vital resource for the nation in cyberspace. Many of its members work in cybersecurity as their full-time jobs when they’re not in uniform, meaning they oftentimes possess unique skills not always found in the active component.

There have been big pushes in recent years to more tightly integrate these Guard and Reserve forces into the larger DOD cyber enterprise to be able to act as surge capability in the event of a major cyber incident against the nation.

Legislation has also been introduced previously to help clear hurdles — real or perceived — to allow the Guard to respond to cyber threats.

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A provision in the committee’s version of the annual defense policy bill, of which an executive summary was released Friday, would require the secretary of defense to review future force employment concepts for cyber operations. The full text of the bill has yet to be released.

Senior congressional officials that briefed reporters Friday pointed to the fact that to date, cyber operations and forces have largely been focused on the strategic level. More and more, there are other avenues to conduct digital actions, officials said, to include tactical cyber.

In fact, the DOD updated its cyber doctrine at the end of 2022 to include for the first time a definition of what it called “expeditionary cyberspace operations,” defined as “[c]yberspace operations that require the deployment of cyberspace forces within the physical domains.”

That recognition was significant given authorities to conduct cyber operations were held at the highest levels of government for many years due to fears that such activities could have unintended consequences or spread into networks beyond the intended targets.

Cybercom owns the offensive cyber capabilities within DOD, and the services conduct offensive cyber operations through Cybercom and the cyber mission forces that each service provides to the command that operate from static, remote locations, mostly focused on IP-based networks.

However, increasingly, there are targets that either aren’t reachable through IP networks or remote access might not be possible. And as DOD has matured its cyber policies, doctrine and capabilities, the reins have begun to loosen up.

Certain factions have sought to use more proximal effects conducted through radio-frequency, which require fewer levels of approval to conduct operations at the very tactical level.  

Several of the services have begun investing in capabilities and forces for their own offensive activities. However, that is mostly in the blended electronic warfare or RF-enabled sphere at the tactical level.

While individual services have started developing and even deploying such forces, all cyber operations must still be connected through Cybercom.

For example, the Army created the 11th Cyber Battalion — which stemmed from the 915th Cyber Warfare Battalion before it — a unit that provides tactical, on-the-ground cyber operations (mostly through RF effects), electronic warfare and information ops. It consists of four companies with over 300 personnel total and five expeditionary cyber teams, which are scalable formations designed to augment units upon request. The Army was recently approved to create another unit called the 12th Cyber Battalion.

The Air Force in the last year or so has developed a concept called Cyber Enabled Air Superiority (CEAS), that aims to use organic Air Force cyber assets to protect its critical missions, such as safeguarding fighter jets from cyberattacks. While the concept is still emerging, the Air Force re-missioned a National Guard unit to initially take charge of the effort.

The Navy has been building what it calls non-kinetic effects teams that are afloat assets to provide cyber, electronic warfare and other similar capabilities for commanders at sea.

The Marine Corps has developed information units for its Marine Expeditionary Forces that include cyber, intelligence, EW and information-related capabilities.

Cybercom has recognized these capabilities, and command officials have begun exploring ways to utilize them, especially as they can serve as entry points for its high-end operators to access hard-to-reach networks that might not be connected to the internet.

These efforts also fit into the concept of the modern triad, which consists of combining the capabilities of space, cyber and special operations forces to create military packages greater than the sum of their parts. SOF are located in some of the hardest places on earth, giving them the opportunity to get close to targets and potentially providing access and entry points for cyber effects.

Given this growth in the concept, the Senate Armed Services Committee also wants the review to encompass the types of personnel DOD will require to conduct cyber operations of all kinds in the future. To date, that has only really included the cyber mission force. As referenced, this could include a much larger pool across the conventional and even special operations forces beyond the Cybercom enterprise.

The summary of the policy bill states the review would include an assessment of personnel policies that could be needed to support any such evolving cyber force, though committee officials clarified this has nothing to do with discussions surrounding the potential creation of a separate and distinct service, or Cyber Force.

“We have focused a lot of this around how we man, train and equip for very exquisite cyber mission forces. There is a bigger pool of people out there,” an official said. “How are we going to employ that full scope of people and how do we need to adjust the personnel policies to be able to keep that flow of people?”

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The provision is part of the annual defense policy bill. The committee released a summary Friday, although the full text of the legislation won’t be released until a later date.

The executive summary of the bill only offers that a provision mandates “a strategy to reestablish a credible deterrence against cyberattacks targeting American critical infrastructure using the full spectrum of military operations.”

A senior congressional official who briefed reporters Friday on the condition of anonymity described the provision as trying to identify a full scope using various methods and full spectrum options to more critically deter adversaries, particularly China, from conducting attacks on critical infrastructure, especially defense critical infrastructure.

An official noted the provision directs DOD toward what the department needs to be doing to more effectively establish a deterrent. Officials in open testimony have indicated a clear concern that Beijing, in particular, continues to attack critical infrastructure.

They singled out Volt and Salt Typhoon by name, noting they’re a growing and more aggressive threat in cyberspace to utilities and critical infrastructure that supports DOD.

Volt Typhoon is one of a number of cyber players from China that have been discovered in U.S. networks, troubling American officials. For its part, Volt Typhoon was discovered inside U.S. critical infrastructure using a technique in the cybersecurity world dubbed “living off the land,” which means it’s using legitimate tools organic to the systems for malicious purposes.

China has become more brazen in intrusions and probes into U.S. and defense networks, particularly in maritime or port environments to potentially limit an American military mobilization response if Chinese leaders decide to invade Taiwan.

Guam, a key U.S. military outpost, has been a top target for Beijing in recent years. Chinese hackers targeted critical infrastructure there, burrowing deep inside a couple of years ago and startling experts who referred to it as one of the largest cyber espionage campaigns against America.  

What has particularly alarmed officials regarding Volt Typhoon is the paradigm shift of Chinese threats moving from espionage and intellectual property theft to holding critical infrastructure at risk.

Salt Typhoon, by contrast, has been found inside networks of telecoms and other companies, likely for the purpose of espionage.

Cyber deterrence has been an elusive policy point for many years. While some academics have pointed to evidence cyber deterrence exists, such as U.S. hesitance to hit back against Russia following its malicious activity in the 2016 election for fear of America’s great digital vulnerability, current and past officials have noted the difficulties of deterrence and how adversaries don’t fear the United States in cyberspace.

Senators recently pressed the Trump administration’s nominee to be the top cyber policy official at DOD on the subject.

“There’s no price to pay for our adversaries. I hope in your counsels within the Defense Department and in the administration you’ll argue for a serious and substantial cyber deterrent stated policy. If it’s not stated, a deterrent doesn’t work,” Sen. Angus King, I-Maine, a fierce critic of perceived weaknesses in cyber deterrence, said at the May hearing.

For her part, Katie Sutton, President Donald Trump’s nominee to be assistant secretary of defense for cyber policy, wrote to senators as part of her confirmation process that a critical part of her role, if confirmed, would be to improve the nation’s defenses and digital deterrent.

“Deterrence is possible in cyberspace and can be made more effective through a combination of denial, resilience, and credible responses. If confirmed, I will review the capabilities we have in our toolkit, integrate military cyberspace capabilities with other tools of national power, and restore deterrence in the cyber domain. One of my core goals as ASD Cyber Policy will be to ensure the Department has the offensive and defensive capabilities and resources necessary to credibly deter adversaries from targeting the United States,” she wrote.

While Salt Typhoon was considered traditional espionage activity, which is virtually impossible to deter, especially given the United States does the same thing, officials are hoping to deter activity like Volt Typhoon in the future.

As Trump was coming back into power for his second term, officials associated with the transition and new administration vowed a top priority would be a more aggressive posture in cyberspace to respond to a bevy of activity against the U.S., namely from China.

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A provision in the fiscal 2025 Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act from the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces would require the Army to create what it calls the Electronic Warfare Center of Excellence within the service’s Training and Doctrine Command.

Centers of excellence are the primary organizations within the Army for training soldiers in their field — be it artillery, aviation or now even electronic warfare — and developing doctrine.

In 2017, the Army decided to take electronic warfare, which was independent, and move it under the cyber branch, in part, due to the close relationship at the tactical level between radio frequency signals and cyber. At the time, the Army was looking to combine these capabilities on the battlefield for integrated radio frequency-enabled cyber effects.

However, in preceding years, experts have noted that there may be limited utility in what some refer to as “tactical cyber” from the Army’s perspective.

As the Russia-Ukraine conflict has shown, electronic warfare will be a critical capability moving forward. Some inside and outside Congress have warned that electronic warfare within the Army still has not gotten the attention it needs as it is subservient to cyber.

“Establishing a dedicated Electronic Warfare Center of Excellence reflects both the indispensable role electronic warfare plays on contemporary battlefield, the unique permeation of electronic warfare across every domain the Army operates in, and the necessity to elevate electronic warfare holistically,” Rep. Rob Wittman (R-VA), chairman of the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee, said in a statement to DefenseScoop. “The lessons learned from Ukraine have showed us that the Army has been caught flatfooted in this critical domain and we need to get on track—establishing a dedicated Electronic Warfare Center of Excellence is an important step in that direction.”

According to the proposed legislation, the Army would have a year after it is enacted into law to transfer electronic warfare-related programs, projects and activities of the Cyber Center of Excellence — where they currently exist — to the Electronic Warfare Center of Excellence.

The subpanel’s bill will be marked up along with all the subcommittees within the full Armed Services Committee on May 22.

Editor’s Note: This story was updated to add comment from Rep. Rob Wittman of Virginia.

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In 2016, State Department officials in Havana, Cuba, started reporting experiences with mysterious, unexplainable medical symptoms impacting their capacities to serve. Intelligence and military staff operating in the U.S., Russia, Serbia, Vietnam, India, Colombia, France, Taiwan and other nations have since recorded similar complications associated with such anomalous health incidents (AHI), or what is now also referred to as “Havana syndrome.”

Often, those suffering from AHI report severe dizziness, headaches, nausea, vertigo, hearing loss, vision problems, anxiety, cognitive difficulties, fatigue and memory loss. 

The precise cause of Havana syndrome still remains unclear, but experts have suggested that a microwave weapon or directed-energy device could be a possible source. Five U.S. intelligence agencies previously concluded in their own federal assessment that the primary cause was likely not a U.S. adversary. However, the New York Times reported on Monday that the House Intelligence Committee has moved to look into the handling of that investigation and possibly challenge those conclusions.

The members of Congress behind this new bill noted in their announcement that the National Defense Authorization Acts for fiscal 2022 and fiscal 2023 included provisions mandating interagency coordination on AHI, and explicit reporting requirements for the State Department — but not the Pentagon.

“I’ve spoken directly with public servants, including from Virginia, impacted by anomalous health incidents. These Americans include U.S. diplomats, servicemembers, intelligence officers, and civilian personnel. As a former CIA case officer and member of the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, I believe that lawmakers and the Pentagon must better understand the extent of these incidents and develop a strategy to address the issue,” Rep. Abigail Spanberger, D-Va., said in a statement.

Spanberger introduced the new bill last week alongside Reps. Brad Wenstrup, R-Ohio, Rick Crawford, R-Ark., Don Bacon, R-Neb., and Trent Kelly, R-Miss., and it was subsequently referred to the House Armed Services Committee.

Text of the Initiating Imperative Reporting on Anomalous Health Incidents Act (or IIR on AHI Act) was shared with DefenseScoop.

Specifically, the legislation would direct Pentagon officials to supply lawmakers in both chambers of Congress with new information regarding all the confirmed or suspected cases of AHI affecting DOD employees and military service members. Details such as the total number of officials that have been impacted to date (broken down by military occupational specialty), the location of the incidents, and the time frame when they occurred, would need to be incorporated. 

Defense officials would be required to participate in that briefing by March 1, 2025. 

Further, the bill also would direct the DOD to supply an updated strategy to guide how it can protect and treat personnel for AHI effects moving forward.

“Usually where there is smoke, there is a fire and since 2016 we’ve seen too many documented cases of unexplained medical symptoms affecting our diplomats and intelligence officers stationed around the world. We need to hear from the Department of Defense about how many this has affected and what they are doing to treat and better protect our people stationed overseas,” Bacon said. 

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The Department of Defense has used bug bounty programs to find cyber weaknesses by incentivizing white-hat hackers to hunt for them. Now, lawmakers want a similar concept to be applied to AI models.

“Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and subject to the availability of appropriations, the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Department of Defense shall develop a bug bounty program for foundational artificial intelligence models being integrated into the missions and operations of the Department of Defense,” states the conference report on the fiscal 2024 National Defense Authorization Act that was released this week.

For the bill, lawmakers define a foundational AI model as “an adaptive generative model that is trained on a broad set of unlabeled data sets that may be used for different tasks with minimal fine-tuning.”

The CDAO would be able to collaborate with leaders of other federal departments and agencies that have cybersecurity and AI expertise on the effort.

No later than one year after the enactment of the legislation, the head of that office would be required to brief congressional committees on the development and implementation of the program and long-term plans for these types of initiatives.

An amendment to the Senate’s version of the NDAA included a provision for an AI bug bounty program, but the House version did not. The mandate for such a program made it into the compromise version.

The CDAO is already exploring bounty concepts for its missions. In July, it issued a call to industry to set up and administer a “bias bounty” program to tackle bias in artificial intelligence systems.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon is exploring use cases for generative artificial intelligence through Task Force Lima and other efforts. However, there are also concerns that adversaries could use generative AI to harm the United States.

The Senate version of the NDAA included an amendment that would require the Defense Department to create and execute a prize competition to evaluate technology for the detection and watermarking of generative AI. The House version did not include such a provision, but the compromise version does.

“Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, under the authority of section 4025 of title 10, United States Code, the Secretary of Defense shall establish a prize competition designed to evaluate technology (including applications, tools, and models) for generative artificial intelligence detection and generative artificial intelligence watermarking,” the NDAA conference report states.

The objective would be to facilitate the research, development, testing and evaluation of these types of technologies to support the secretaries of the military departments and combatant commanders “in warfighting requirements,” as well as transitioning such technologies from prototyping to production.

For the bill, lawmakers define generative AI detection as “the positive identification of the use of generative artificial intelligence in the generation of” digital content. Generative AI watermarking is defined as “embedding within such content data conveying attribution of the generation of such content to generative artificial intelligence.”

Private sector entities, defense contractors, academia, federally funded R&D centers, and federal departments and agencies would be eligible to participate in the prize competition, which would be administered by the undersecretary of defense for research and engineering.

Congress hasn’t voted yet on the compromise NDAA.

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The directive comes from the comprise draft of the fiscal 2024 National Defense Authorization Act that was unveiled this week after members of the House and Senate hashed out their respective versions of the bill.

Under the provision, the secretary of defense must enter into an agreement or contract with a capable entity to conduct an independent study on the lessons learned from information ops conducted by the U.S., Ukraine, Russia and NATO nations in the run-up to the Kremlin’s invasion and throughout the war.

The study must include an assessment of information operations capabilities of Russia prior to, and since the invasion of Ukraine; an assessment of notable successes or challenges with information ops conducted by the U.S., NATO member countries and Ukraine prior to, and since the invasion; and recommendations for improvements to U.S. information operations to enhance effectiveness, as well as recommendations on how information ops may be improved to support deterrence.

Information operations — and the information environment more broadly — have significantly increased in importance and prominence in recent years. Adversaries have sought to exploit that environment through disinformation, misinformation, information ops and other activities as a means of undermining U.S. and allied interests without having to confront them in direct military conflict.

“Russia’s influence actors have adapted their efforts to increasingly hide their hand, laundering their preferred messaging through a vast ecosystem of Russian proxy websites, individuals, and organizations that appear to be independent news sources,” the 2023 annual threat assessment of the United States intelligence community, states.

As an example, the Pentagon’s 2023 Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment provides a vignette of Russia’s malign influence efforts that sought to take criticism away from its actions the day it invaded Ukraine and draw attention to alleged oppression by the West. It notes that the day of the invasion, a Kremlin-run media organization disguised as a regular news outlet posted a map on social media that purported to show airstrikes in the last 24 hours, warning: “Don’t let the mainstream media’s Eurocentrism dictate your moral support for victims of war. A human life is a human life. Condemn war everywhere.”

However, that post omitted Russia’s role in bombings in Syria while drawing attention to Israeli attacks there.

Outside advocacy groups have sought to improve DOD’s prowess in this realm. And Congress has been concerned that the Pentagon has fell behind recently, requiring several studies, strategies and changes in past years’ defense bills, to include the creation of the principal information operations adviser a few years ago.

For its part, the DOD has sought to address concerns. Last year, the Pentagon published an update to its doctrine on information and in July it published its Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment, released publicly in November.

The military services have also sought to develop their own strategies and doctrine, with the Marine Corps last year publishing Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication-8, Information, the Air Force developing an information warfare strategy and the Army publishing Army Doctrinal Publication 3-13, Information — it’s first such doctrine for information — in November.

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In the conference report for the reconciled version of the fiscal 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, legislators noted that they nixed a provision that was included in the Senate bill that would have directed the secretary of defense to enter into an agreement with the National Academy of Public Administration to conduct an evaluation regarding the advisability of establishing a separate military branch for digital warriors.

There has been a growing chorus in recent years arguing for the creation of a cyber service or cyber force, that would be the seventh uniformed military service following the creation of the Space Force in 2019.

Each of the military services is responsible for providing personnel for a set number of teams to U.S. Cyber Command, which then employs those forces in operations for the other geographic combatant commands. But each branch has its own identity, culture, and way of classifying and providing forces to Cybercom — and observers have argued that this has been to the detriment of cyber warriors given they are soldiers or airmen or sailors first, with a secondary focus on cyber.

The argument for a new model is that the current system does not work. However, opponents of a new service say there hasn’t been enough time to allow the current system to prove itself — especially given Cybercom has only just gained full control over its budget in October with service-like authorities much like U.S. Special Operations Command.

Some outside organizations were upset to see the provision excluded from this year’s legislation.

“The exclusion of the Cyber Force study in the NDAA is beyond disappointing; it’s a deliberate impediment to progress in an area where it’s needed most,” Nathan Rolfe, president of the Association of US Cyber Forces (AUSCF), a nonprofit dedicated to advancing the capabilities and effectiveness of the United States in the cyber domain, said.

“With the cyber talent gap continuing to worsen nationwide, and traditional military thought still holding back the DOD from realizing its full manning and operational potential in the cyber domain, we cannot keep pace with the aggressive advancements of our major power peer competitors. This omission from the NDAA is not a delay; it represents backward momentum in terms of national security,” Rolfe added.

AUSCF has been advocating for the creation of a cyber force. The organization noted that while the Senate bill fell short of establishing a separate cyber force, a feasibility study would have been the first proactive step in safeguarding the nation’s security and an investment in the future resilience of U.S. digital infrastructure.

Additionally, the Military Cyber Professionals Association (MCPA), a nonprofit dedicated to advocating for military cyber issues, sent a memo in March to both houses of Congress urging the creation of a United States Cyber Force in this year’s annual defense policy bill.

“Given the serious consequences of both action and inaction, the MCPA looks forward to serious analysis of the options at hand to reorganize and establish a Cyber Corps, Force, Service, or the like. Studies should be conducted both internal to DOD, including those sponsored by DOD entities, and those independent that are unencumbered by the requirement to tow the current party line,” Chris Cleary, MCPA national president, said in a statement.

The Senate’s provision, introduced by Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand (D-N.Y.), that was stripped would have examined the best route forward between establishing a separate armed force dedicated to operations within cyberspace or refining and evolving the current approach for Cybercom, based on the Socom model.

Lawmakers have danced around the issue of an independent cyber service in years prior, mandating the Department of Defense include an assessment of the costs, benefits and values of establishing a uniformed cyber service in the 2022 cyber posture review, as well as a separate examination of the current cyber enterprise; how the services should man, train and equip for cyber; if a single military service should be responsible for basic, intermediate and advanced cyber training of the cyber mission force; and if the DOD should create a separate service.

Members of Congress have not been pleased with how the Pentagon has responded to these assessments and reports — and in some cases, not providing assessments — leading to calls for an independent study.

Moreover, in successive NDAAs Congress has sought to address concerns related to the readiness of the current cyber forces, to include a provision in this year’s bill to create a more standard approach to how the military services present forces.

The House version did not include a provision regarding a study, but had two provisions aimed at improving and examining the current structures. The first directed a review of DOD’s management of cyber operations, while the other directed the Pentagon to assess the resiliency of its cyber operators given personnel often work long hours and are always conducting operations in constant contact with adversaries in cyberspace — either defending DOD networks from daily enemy probes or carrying out offensive ops.

The review was included in the conference bill’s report language and the assessment was adopted by conferees.

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The Senate earlier this year passed a provision as part of its version of the annual defense policy bill, that would have directed the secretary of defense to establish a new organization to support the requirements of U.S. Cyber Command along with other combatant commands, military departments and agencies. However, in the conference report for the reconciled version of the fiscal 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, House and Senate conferees noted that they took the provision out.

“The conferees agree that intelligence support to the planning and execution of cyber operations conducted below the level of armed conflict, for preparation of the operational environment, and at each level of operational art — strategic, operational, and tactical — must be substantially improved. The conferees believe that the causes of, and solutions to, this requirement are complex,” the report states. “The conferees are not prepared at this time to dictate a specific organizational solution, but expect the Secretary of Defense to generate and implement one.”

For years, dating back to when Cybercom was created, there have been talks about building the capability and capacity for developing organic cyber intelligence within the U.S. military. Relatedly, as cyber has grown in importance, there have been increasing discussions at the Defense Intelligence Agency regarding what constitutes foundational cyber intelligence.

Lawmakers are concerned because, of more than two dozen agencies that focus on intelligence, there isn’t a direct line out of Cybercom’s intelligence shop that focuses on nation-state threats from a military angle. For example, the military intelligence apparatus has very specific knowledge of adversary systems and specifications, but that’s not always the case in cyberspace.

The conference report notes that as a still maturing organization, Cybercom must improve its ability to define and articulate requirements for intelligence support, noting it’s likely the command will still require assistance from the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. The command is co-located and shares a leader with the NSA.

Moreover, the document suggests that the cyber mission force — the personnel each military service provides to Cybercom to conduct cyber operations — does not possess sufficient deep technical expertise nor adequate access to data to generate the required level of analysis organically.

“At the strategic and operational level, there is a clear need for improved foundational intelligence. The conferees are concerned that the Department of Defense will continue to fail to address this persistent shortfall without a legislative mandate and the creation of an organizational element dedicated to the task,” the report states.

“A significant portion of the target systems analysis support that is currently lacking could be provided under a decentralized, federated model based on cooperative teaming among the existing service intelligence centers (and the Department’s foreign material acquisition and human intelligence components). This would obviate the need to establish a new, separate center dedicated to the cyber domain, but making a coalition work effectively on a sustained basis could prove to be very challenging without a committed leadership entity. The conferees urge the Secretary to devise an effective and sustainable organizational solution,” according to the report.

Enduring dual-hat relationship?

The report notes that vital network and systems engineering analysis support for Cybercom likely can only be achieved through NSA partnership. However, NSA’s national intelligence mission and budget cannot be further burdened with the level of tailored support required for military operations, according to conferees.

Rather, the secretary of defense should provide funding for Cybercom, separate from the national intelligence budget, to acquire and sustain the required technical analytical capability and capacity. This should be done in stages, lawmakers say, beginning with a small-scale pilot to develop a practical model that can be replicated.

They also note that the administration reported another favorable review for the dual-hat arrangement, where Cybercom and NSA share a boss and are co-located.

The report notes that the foregoing assessment suggests that this partnership should be extended, with the Pentagon’s independent funding responsibilities clearly delineated.

“Accordingly, the conferees urge the Secretary of Defense to develop an organization, and provide funding, personnel, and a management plan for the intelligence collection and analysis necessary to support the missions of Cyber Command and the other combatant commands in the disciplines of foundational intelligence, target systems analysis, and network and systems engineering analysis,” the document says.

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