Meadowlands is a mobile, ground-based offensive counterspace system that uses radio signals to jam adversary satellite communications. Developed by prime contractor L3Harris, the capability provides a significant upgrade to the Space Force’s current platform — the Counter Communications System (CCS) — by adding a software-defined architecture, drastically reducing weapon size and integrating automation.

L3Harris formally passed system verification review for Meadowlands in April. The Space Force then announced that Meadowlands received fielding approval on May 2 to begin training guardians on the system, with next steps being “upgrading the operating system to fulfill remote operations capabilities and multi-system management in the near future,” according to Space Operations Command.

The contractor has already delivered the first two Meadowlands units to the Space Force and the system is now going through government testing, Erik Ballard, L3Harris’s general manager for space antennas, surveillance systems, space and airborne systems, told DefenseScoop in a recent interview. The milestone was completed about six months ahead of schedule, and the company is now on track to deliver even more units through 2025, he added.

“It is more than just a block upgrade, it’s a step-change in capability,” Ballard said.

The first iteration of CCS became operational in 2004 and has received incremental upgrades over the years. L3Harris completed the final upgrade, known as 10.2, in March 2020 after the company received a development contract in 2019 to deliver five Meadowlands systems to the Space Force by December 2025.

L3Harris also received a production contract for Meadowlands in 2021 that includes over 20 additional units, the first of which is expected to be delivered this year, Ballard noted.

“The software-defined architecture … allows us to upgrade it quickly with the changing threat environment much more affordably and much faster,” he said. “I also think that the footprint size — the analogy I like to use … is, for [CCS 10.2], all your equipment fit in a bus and you hooked up an antenna behind it. Now, all that equipment fits in your SUV.”

Meadowlands also adds a significant amount of automation and remote command-and-control capabilities, meaning that a single guardian can do tasks that would have previously required multiple people. 

Col. Bryon McClain, program executive for space domain awareness and combat power at Space System Command, told reporters in April that the automation capabilities of Meadowlands will give the service a significant amount of flexibility.

“Having a system that we can reduce the number of people that are physically sitting by the antenna — turning knobs and pushing buttons — the farther we can separate that,” McClain said during a media roundtable at Space Symposium. “It gives us the ability to centralize how we do business.”

After years of keeping its offensive and defensive counterspace capabilities behind closed doors, the Space Force has recently entered a new era of openly talking about its plans to weaponize the domain against adversaries. In April, the service published a new warfighting framework that outlines three mission areas — orbital, electromagnetic and cyberspace warfare — for counterspace operations.

As the Space Force has conducted operational training on Meadowlands with guardians, Ballard said the process has been “night and day” compared to previous CCS platforms. L3Harris partnered with the Space Force early in the system’s development to ensure military personnel could easily and quickly train on the new Meadowlands platforms, he said.

“Over the last couple of months as we’ve went through government testing, [the training aspect] has really resonated with the users,” Ballard said. “That’s something that’s been in the process for a number of years. And now to hear it in feedback from users — we did the right thing there by starting that earlier.”

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Titled “Space Warfighting – A Framework for Planners,” the document provides the service’s most detailed plan to date for conducting warfare “in, from, and to space” as the domain becomes increasingly contested. The framework’s primary goal is to establish a common lexicon for guardians and joint planners focused on counterspace operations. It lists offensive and defensive options the Space Force can take to achieve what it calls “space superiority.”

“It is the formative purpose of the Space Force to achieve space superiority — to ensure freedom of movement in space for our forces while denying the same to our adversaries,” Chief of Space Operations Gen. Chance Saltzman wrote in the framework’s foreword. “We must be prepared to employ capabilities for offensive and defensive purposes to deter and, if necessary, defeat aggressors that threaten our vital national interests.”

The document’s release comes as Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has been emphasizing the importance of promoting a “warfighting ethos” across the Defense Department. That rhetoric has trickled down to Space Force leaders, who are now openly discussing the military’s ability to weaponize the space domain through counterspace operations after years of keeping those plans and capabilities behind closed doors.

Lt. Gen. Shawn Bratton, deputy chief of space operations for strategy, plans, programs and requirements, told reporters Wednesday that the new framework represents a shift for the United States’ newest military service towards a more codified strategy and doctrine.

“This space warfighting document is in that vein of the natural maturing of the Space Force, and this one is very specific to space superiority,” Bratton said. “This document is very specific to our core function of space control and how we think about warfighting in space.”

According to officials, counterspace operations will be executed across three mission areas: orbital, electromagnetic and cyberspace warfare. The document also details different offensive and defensive counterspace actions guardians can conduct at the direction of combatant commanders.

For example, offensive actions include “orbital strike,” which can destroy, disrupt or degrade an adversary’s space platforms on orbit either through kinetic or non-kinetic means. The framework also lists “space link interdiction” — options to affect an enemy’s space communications links — and “terrestrial strike” — which focuses on an opponent’s infrastructure on Earth — as offensive options.

The Space Force divides its defensive actions into two groups: active and passive. “Active space defense” includes options to escort friendly satellites on orbit; conduct reactive counterattacks against enemy space systems that pose a threat; and suppress adversary counterspace targeting abilities. The framework lists seven mechanisms for “passive space defense” that aim to proactively protect the Space Force’s capabilities against foes.

Bratton noted the framework isn’t a comprehensive list of what systems the Space Force already has in its arsenal, but will hopefully help frame the service’s discussions on what technologies and systems it will need moving forward. 

“I think there are concepts in here that maybe we don’t have capabilities for today, that maybe it’s time to start thinking about those things,” he said. “The document does prod guardians in those areas. Like, let’s find out if there’s a military advantage in space-to-space weapons. Or, let’s find out if there’s a military advantage in other areas.”

Overall, the document attempts to underscore the contributions the Space Force will make to the joint force in future conflicts, as protecting the other services from space-enabled attacks is now considered one of the organization’s core missions.

“The success of the joint force really does depend on the success in the space domain. We have to be able to take away that capability from an adversary, maintain that capability for ourselves — or the whole joint force will suffer,” he said. “It’s a big responsibility. The guardians of the Space Force are going to carry it.”

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The so-called “space warfighting” framework is expected to outline the common vocabulary and concepts used by the service in order to achieve what it calls “space superiority” — that is, the ability for the United States to operate freely in the space domain while also denying an enemy’s ability to do the same. The document will also categorize adversary on-orbit capabilities, link structures, ground facilities and network targets, Saltzman said during a webinar hosted by the Mitchell Institute.

“What the framework does is, it defines our terms so that planners — and this is space planners, but this is [also] joint planners — to make sure that our capabilities are accounted for and integrated fully into all the operational design,” Saltzman said. “We felt like we owed the Joint Force that set of framework, that set of definitions, so that we could have the right kinds of discussions.”

The drafting of the new framework comes as the Space Force continues efforts to more accurately convey its mission and warfighting functions both within the Defense Department and to the general public. In recent weeks, Saltzman and other senior service leadership have begun openly discussing the Space Force’s ability to conduct warfare in the space domain — marking a shift in messaging following years of keeping such rhetoric behind closed doors.

“We must think of space as a warfighting domain, rather than just a collection of support activities that the Space Force must organize, train, equip and conduct warfighting operations as an integral part of the joint and combined force,” Saltzman said March 3 during his keynote speech at the annual AFA Warfare Symposium in Denver, Colorado.

Saltzman said during Wednesday’s webinar that senior leadership across the Pentagon fully support the Space Force’s mission to enable all the military services to conduct joint operations. Likewise, younger warfighters who understand today’s “digital environment” understand the importance of space-based capabilities, he added.

However, there is a group in between those two levels that aren’t as informed as others, he said. The new space warfighting framework will provide a doctrine-level lexicon for that middle group and others as a way to help inform them of the Space Force’s missions.

“Here’s the terms we can talk about. Here’s what orbital warfare means. Here’s how we use electronic warfare. Here’s how we would use cyber warfare, and in pursuit of space superiority, protect what we have and deny an adversary,” Saltzman said regarding what the document will lay out.

Additionally, the service’s Space Training and Readiness Command (STARCOM) will also soon publish the Space Force Doctrine Document–1 (SFDD-1). Saltzman previously said that the document will articulate the doctrinal concepts shaping the service moving forward — including the service’s newest core function known as “space control,” among others.

The concept encapsulates the Space Force’s ability to deny, degrade, disrupt or even destroy adversary space systems using both kinetic and non-kinetic weapons. Space control can refer to both offensive and defensive orbital warfare, electromagnetic warfare and other counterspace operations.

“We have to deny the adversary the ability to use the space-enabled targeting that has now made them so lethal — particularly in the western Pacific — against our other terrestrial forces,” Saltzman said. “They have increased the range and the accuracy of their weapons because of that space-enabled targeting system, and it’s the Space Force’s job to deny them that.”

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“With our commercial assets, we have observed five different objects in space maneuvering in and out around each other in synchronicity and in control. That’s what we call dogfighting in space,” Vice Chief of Space Operations Gen. Michael Guetlein said Tuesday during the annual McAleese Defense Programs Conference. “They are practicing tactics, techniques and procedures to do on-orbit space operations from one satellite to another.”

A Space Force spokesperson told DefenseScoop that the series of demonstrations occurred last year and featured three Chinese Shiyan-24C experimental satellites and two experimental space objects known as the Shijian-6 05A/B. The rendezvous proximity operations tests were observed in low-Earth orbit via commercially available data, they added.

The demonstrations serve as yet another example of adversary advancements in space-based capabilities over the last few years. Co-orbital satellites could maneuver close to U.S. space systems in an attempt to disrupt or even directly hit them — raising further concerns about their potential use for military operations.

“Unfortunately, our current adversaries are willing to go against international norms of behavior … and they’re willing to do it in very unsafe and unprofessional manners,” Guetlein said. 

Along with maneuverable space vehicles, China has worked to develop anti-satellite missiles and other non-kinetic weapons that can attack U.S. platforms on-orbit. Russia has demonstrated similar counterspace capabilities, such as its 2021 test of an ASAT weapon that destroyed another Russian satellite. Moscow is also reportedly developing a nuclear space weapon that could create a massive energy wave and destroy multiple sats.

At the same time, the Space Force is monitoring cyber operations against U.S. space assets almost daily. Adversaries are also using their own satellites to shadow American on-orbit systems in a “cat-and-mouse game,” Guetlein said.

Guetlein’s comments come as the Space Force begins discussing its efforts to develop counterspace capabilities more publicly. The service recently added “space control” — that is, the ability to disrupt, degrade or destroy adversary systems via both kinetic and non-kinetic effects — to its list of “core functions.” Space control ops could include orbital warfare, electromagnetic warfare and other counterspace efforts.

And while the Space Force may be actively pursuing both offensive and defensive capabilities, Guetlein warned that Washington is at risk of losing its edge over Beijing and Moscow.

“There used to be a capability gap between us and our near peers, mainly driven by the technological advancement of the United States,” he said. “That capability gap has significantly narrowed, and we’ve got to change the way we’re looking at space, where that capability gap may reverse to not be in our favor anymore.”

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“The place where I think we should be moving faster is counterspace. We need to protect the joint force from the targeting and sensing that China, in particular, is fielding now,” Kendall said Thursday during a webinar hosted by the Mitchell Institute. “And we need more effective and efficient ways of sending a single interceptor against a single satellite.”

Counterspace weapons are capabilities able to disable, destroy or disrupt space capabilities through physical, electronic or cyber means. Although the U.S. has kept details about the types of counterspace weapons it has in development or deployed behind closed doors, the Defense Department has routinely sounded alarms over adversary capabilities — such as China’s work on anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.

Kendall acknowledged that the Department of the Air Force has done significant work to identify ways to address the problems posed by enemy counterspace capabilities but warned that much more needs to be done.

In its budget request for fiscal 2025, the Space Force allocated $37.4 million in research-and-development funds towards at least two counterspace systems. The first is the offensive Counter Communications System, a mobile electronic warfare device able to block adversary satcom signals. The second is the defensive Bounty Hunter system, which will geolocate satellite communications and detect electromagnetic interference on radio frequencies from allies and adversaries.

As Kendall prepares to depart from his role as secretary of the Air Force, he said there has been “very good progress” made in the last four years in initiating development and fielding for other space-based capabilities.

“We’ve largely moved to more resilient architectures, distributed communications [and] distributed missile warning,” he said. “We’re looking at sensing, we’re looking at [ground-moving target indication] capability moving there.”

With a new administration and leadership coming to the Pentagon when President-elect Donald Trump takes office in January, Kendall emphasized the importance of prioritizing development of key space capabilities — including satellite communications, sensing, targeting and missile warning.

“Increasingly, we’re moving capabilities into space,” Kendall said. “The joint force is going to be very dependent upon space, and I think, quite frankly, the Space Force and space capabilities are going to be decisive in a future conflict, particularly with a peer competitor.”

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Service leaders have warned about the risks to the ground segments of U.S. military space architectures from cyber threats or other adversary methods, seeing them as a potential “backdoor” way of attacking American satellite communications.

Additionally, delays in delivering ground systems from industry can set back space programs.

“I’ve always been an advocate that probably our biggest threats are ground. And I would love to see a future — and I’m thinking way out there — that more satellites are autonomous. I really see a future where there are autonomous satellites with onboard processing. I mean, you think about what’s in your iPhone today, I mean, there’s no reason why we can’t be doing much more stuff onboard processing, and just downlink and tasking to whoever we need it to,” Frank Calvelli, assistant secretary of the Air Force for space acquisition and integration, said Friday at an event hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

“So, I envision a day down the road, maybe 20 years, where there’s a lot less ground stations and a lot less operators. Right? And then if you think about where all these commercial companies are going with direct-to-phone kind of service from space, you can almost envision you don’t need ground terminals anymore, you can go directly to a commercial provider or commercial providers, right in terms of these … systems. So, I see a future that’s very autonomous and very much more onboard processing — and I think that makes us much more resilient and survivable than a ground station with lots of people and lots of network connections inside that could be vulnerable to cyber. But that’s just my personal view of the future,” he said.

The Department of Defense is also concerned about adversaries’ anti-satellite weapons that could disrupt the services that space systems provide to military and civilian users. The Pentagon relies on satellites for critical missions such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), positioning, navigation and timing (PNT), and communications.

To mitigate these threats, the Space Development Agency is pursuing what it calls a Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA), which includes tranches of data transport and missile-tracking satellites that will operate in low-Earth orbit.

A White House official recently told reporters that Russia is developing a new “anti-satellite capability” that hasn’t been deployed yet. The system could be a space-based weapon with a nuclear component, according to reports. The Kremlin has denied these allegations.

At the CSIS event Friday, Calvelli was asked whether the U.S. is at risk of relying too much on LEO constellations to mitigate risks to American platforms.

He said the Pentagon needs to diversify.

“I think that proliferation in LEO is one approach to resiliency. Other approaches include also that we need to be doing more of is diversification of orbits. And so if you look at the history of the [Defense] Department, most of our stuff was in [geosynchronous orbit], right? Except for GPS, most of our stuff is in GEO — all of our missile warning, all of our MILSATCOM kind of capabilities. And so I’m an advocate of proliferation everywhere. I think we should be proliferating more in [medium-Earth orbit], we should be preferring more in GEO, as well. And so I think we’re taking the first steps through SDA with proliferation in LEO, but I also see us proliferating more at other orbits and trying strange orbits too, as well,” Calvelli said.

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The request comes as the U.S. is facing growing threats to its space systems, including cyber warfare activities; electronic attack platforms; lasers designed to blind or damage satellite sensors; ground-launched missiles; and “space-to-space orbital engagement systems” — in other words, satellites that can attack other satellites.

The enhanced operational test and training infrastructure that the Space Force plans to invest in “will be the backbone of our readiness as we prepare for high-intensity fights. This infrastructure will allow guardians to execute realistic training against simulated adversaries to validate our tactics,” Chief of Space Operations Gen. Chance Saltzman said at the McAleese and Associates annual Defense Programs Conference.

In September, Space Training and Readiness Command conducted its inaugural Black Skies exercise, which focused on electronic warfare. “Through these events, we are continuing continuously enhancing tactics and operational concepts to create a ready force for the emerging threats,” Saltzman said.

However, the training infrastructure still isn’t sufficient.

Saltzman told DefenseScoop that the Space Force is “still working through all the details” about where it will invest the $340 million.

“But just in general terms … [in the past] we thought of space as more of a benign environment. Our focus was on how do we get satellites to last as long as possible on orbit doing the missions that we need … It wasn’t prioritized in the same degree about thinking about a contested domain. Now, we are prioritizing that, obviously, but I don’t have the training facilities and infrastructure that allows us to do the kinds of simulations and training that we need” to fully prepare for that, he said.

“The simulators are built around procedural currency with the weapon systems, not necessarily interacting with a thinking adversary. So we want to enhance the simulators. We also recognize that range activities, which are so important to all of the other services to practice their skills to validate concepts to validate tactics — we don’t really have that either. So we’re expanding our capabilities to do constructive virtual training and ranges so we can conduct those kinds of events,” he added.

DefenseScoop asked Saltzman if guardians will be practicing for offensive as well as defensive operations.

“That’s a great question because, you know, I don’t think about it in those terms,” he said. “Operations can be offensive or defensive. And of course, we’re going to practice the full spectrum of operations so we can offer the secretary of defense and the president the full scope of independent options. That’s what’s required of us. But you know, we don’t talk about offensive F-35s and defensive F-35s [when it comes to Air Force fighter jets, for example] — it’s the operations they’re performing. And actually going through those war games and going through the exercises is where we develop those operational concepts.”

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EW technologies are essential to the service’s mission to protect military satellites and radars, and according to Lt. Gen. B. Chance Saltzman, they’re becoming more of a priority as potential adversaries attempt to exploit America’s vulnerabilities in space and cyberspace.

“As seen in the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Russia’s disruption of commercial satellite communications and the provider’s prompt adaptation to restore service is but one example of what we can expect in the future, but on a far greater scale,” Saltzman said in response to advance policy questions from the Senate Armed Services Committee. “As such, the USSF must develop and field a diversified array of active, adaptive, and networked electronic warfare capabilities to project power and defend the Joint Force across the competition continuum.”

If confirmed by the Senate, Saltzman will lead the service as its second-ever chief of space operations.

“We must develop and employ cutting-edge technology to expand our maneuver space and provide the Joint Force maximum operational flexibility while denying a potential adversary the ability to do the same,” he told lawmakers. “If confirmed, I will work with Congress to ensure that USSF Force Design includes the necessary EW capabilities to support the Joint Force.” 

For the last two years, Saltzman has served as the deputy CSO for operations, cyber and nuclear. In that capacity, he established an Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO) branch within the Space Force specifically to coordinate and partner with other Defense Department components in this area. That branch works to advocate for and increase Space Force-aligned EMSO capabilities and to ensure full integration with the Pentagon’s other EW-supporting entities. 

“Space Force is currently working with the Joint Electromagnetic Warfare Center on a DOD-wide Electronic Warfare Assessment of our EW capabilities to inform funding recommendations,” Saltzman noted.

The United States is in a race with China and Russia when it comes to space and counterspace capabilities, he suggested.

“We’re still the greatest spacefaring nation on the planet,” Saltzman told lawmakers during the hearing on Tuesday. “Unfortunately, our adversaries are investing heavily to close that gap and supersede us. I’m worried about the pace with which they are making those changes. China, first amongst them, and Russia also committed to investing heavily in the kinds of capabilities that are going to disrupt, degrade and even destroy our on-orbit capabilities — and so it’s that pace of change and their commitment to disabling it that’s most concerning to me.”

In a report released in April, the Defense Intelligence Agency assessed that Beijing and Moscow in the coming years will likely deploy more capable counterspace weapons such as EW systems that could be used to disrupt or destroy satellites that the U.S. military depends on.

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The Pentagon views space as a likely battleground in any future great power war in which counterspace weapons would pose a threat to DOD satellites that are used for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, communications, positioning navigation and timing, and other missions.

“China and Russia value superiority in space, and as a result, they’ll seek ways to strengthen their space and counterspace programs and determine better ways to integrate them within their respective militaries,” Kevin Ryder, senior defense intelligence analyst for space and counterspace at DIA, said during a briefing with reporters at the Pentagon when the new report was released. “The U.S. Space posture will be increasingly challenged and on orbit assets will face new risks.”

Lasers, also known as directed energy weapons (DEWs), are one of the major threats identified in the study on “Challenges to Security in Space – 2022.”

“During the past two decades, Chinese defense research has proposed the development of several reversible and nonreversible counterspace DEWs for reversible dazzling of electro-optical sensors and even potentially destroying satellite components,” said the new Pentagon report on challenges to security in space.

China has multiple ground-based laser weapons of varying power levels to disrupt, degrade, or damage satellites, including a “limited” capability to employ laser systems against satellite sensors, according to the study.

“By the mid- to late-2020s, China may field higher power systems that extend the threat to the structures of non-optical satellites,” it warned.

Meanwhile, Russia has several ground-based lasers, including the Peresvet, that can blind satellite sensors. Russian leaders and Russian press reports have publicly touted the systems’ ability to attack spacecraft, the study noted.

“Russia probably will field lasers that are more capable of damaging satellites in the mid-to-late 2020s. By 2030, Russia may also field higher power systems that extend the threat to the structures of all satellites, not just electro-optical ISR,” the document said.

Powerful lasers aren’t the only capabilities that Beijing and Moscow could use to attack U.S. and other nations’ spacecraft. Others include anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles, electronic warfare, cyber and orbital systems.

China has already launched multiple missiles capable of destroying satellites, Ryder said.

The People’s Liberation Army’s operational ground-based ASAT missile is intended to target systems in Low-Earth orbit (LEO). However, the reach of Chinese missiles could be extended into geostationary orbit (GEO), according to the study

“China probably intends to pursue additional ASAT weapons that are able to destroy satellites up to GEO,” according to the report.

In 2013, the nation launched an object into space on a ballistic trajectory with a peak orbital radius near GEO altitudes, it noted.

“No new satellites were released from the object, and the launch profile was inconsistent with traditional [space-launch vehicles], ballistic missiles, or sounding rocket launches for scientific research, suggesting a basic capability could exist to use ASAT technology against satellites at great distances and not just LEO,” the document said.

Russia is developing a mobile missile that could destroy satellites and crewed space vehicles, Ryder said.

“Although Russia publicly describes Nudol as a ballistic missile defense system, it has an inherent counterspace capability,” the report said.

This system was most recently tested in November, and it demonstrated the capability to destroy satellites in LEO, according to the DIA assessment.

Russia is also reportedly developing an air-launched ASAT missile called Burevestnika that could be fired from Russian military planes and target spacecraft in LEO, the study noted.

Electronic warfare capabilities are another arrow in Beijing and Moscow’s quiver.

“The PLA considers EW capabilities to be critical assets for modern warfare, and its doctrine emphasizes using EW to suppress or deceive enemy equipment. The PLA routinely incorporates in its exercises jamming and antijamming techniques that probably are intended to deny multiple types of space-based communications, radar systems, and GPS navigation support to military movement and precision-guided munitions employment,” the report said.

It continued: “China probably is developing jammers dedicated to targeting [synthetic aperture radar], including aboard military reconnaissance platforms. Interfering with SAR satellites very likely protects terrestrial assets by denying imagery and targeting in any potential conflict involving the United States or its allies. In addition, China probably is developing jammers to target SATCOM over a range of frequency bands, including military-protected extremely high frequency communications.”

The Kremlin is also investing in EW tools to deny, degrade and disrupt communications, and deny the use of space-based imagery, Ryder said.

Moscow has developed and fielded “a full spectrum” of capabilities with mobility, automation, and performance improvements to counter Western space-enabled command, control, communications, computers, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities and weapons guidance systems, the study said.

China and Russia could also use offensive cyberwarfare capabilities to support operations against space-based assets, the report noted.

In addition to ground-based threats, the Pentagon is also concerned about space-based anti-satellite weapons, which the DIA describes as “orbital threats.”

China is developing satellite inspection and repair capabilities that could also function as a weapon, the report said.

Beijing has launched multiple satellites to conduct scientific experiments on space maintenance technologies and space debris cleanup, including the launch of the Shijian-21 in October. The spacecraft later moved a derelict BeiDou navigation satellite to a “high graveyard orbit” above GEO, the study noted.

Satellites with robotic arm technology, such as the Shijian-17, could be used in a future system for grappling other nations’ satellites, according to the DIA.

Russia also continues to research and develop sophisticated orbital capabilities that could have military applications.

“Inspection and servicing satellites can closely approach satellites to inspect and repair malfunctions; this same technology could also be used to conduct an attack on other countries’ satellites, resulting in temporary or permanent damage,” the report said.

In November 2019, Russia deployed a satellite that appeared to begin following a U.S. national security satellite, “approaching close enough to create potentially dangerous operating conditions,” according to the DIA.

U.S. defense officials are concerned that satellites could “kinetically kill” other spacecraft by colliding with them in orbit.

In July 2020, Russia ejected an object into orbit from its Cosmos 2543 satellite which was located near another Russian satellite. The DIA called this a test of a space-based ASAT weapon.

It also described the Cosmos 2504 and Cosmos 2536 as prototype Russian ASAT weapons that could “kinetically kill” satellites in LEO.

FedScoop asked DIA officials which of these types of counterspace capabilities posed the greatest threat.

“From my perspective, all of the capabilities are equal in nature. It depends on how and why and when the adversary would come to use them,” Ryder said during the briefing.

John Huth , DIA intelligence officer for space and counterspace, said: “I don’t think there is a particular capability that I would pull out and say I’m worried more about this or that, because it’s almost context dependent. That depends on the particular conflict or stage of conflict.”

When asked to compare the relative counterspace capabilities of China and Russia, Ryder said the Chinese, possessing greater resources, have put more financial and military effort towards developing their capabilities. Russia has been more “streamlined” in its approach due to other military modernization priorities.

The DIA officials declined to say whether Beijing and Moscow are outpacing the DOD in this area.

“Our job is really to inform on foreign military capabilities, not really do what I would call a U.S. comparative assessment,” Huth said.

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