Established in early 2023, MCIC is designed to more tightly link the service’s information forces — including cyber, intelligence and space — in theater with the broader joint force.

The organization’s commander, currently Maj. Gen. Joseph Matos, holds many roles, to include:

• Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command commander.
• Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber Marine Corps commander, the Cyber Command service component that conducts operations for other combatant commands, in this case, for Special Operations Command.
• Joint Task Force Ares commander, originally the counter-ISIS cyber task force but now is focused on nation-state activity, primarily, China.
• The service cryptologic component commander, the service organization for the National Security Agency.
• Marine Corps Forces Space Command commander.

The forces under these six hats are all uniquely assigned with many belonging to Cybercom, Space Command and NSA, but coordinating their relationships under a new construct has proven challenging.

“Those relationships were all known and understood a year and a half ago when we set up the command, but how those things could come together functionally, legally, policy-wise has been a learning point,” Col. Benjamin Grass, director of operations for the MCIC, MARFORCYBER and MARFORSPACE, told DefenseScoop in an interview. “How do you command and control that organization? Do all of those entities come together for convergence at the two-star general who commands all those, or is there an entity below that that can coordinate and direct, task, if you will? Those are the conversations that we’re having.”

Experimentation took place primarily in the Pacific region. When forces participated in these simulations or were requested for an operation, MCIC had to work through support that spanned multiple combatant commands — Indo-Pacific Command and Cybercom, for example – and through the service itself.

Grass said they’re still learning how best to do this, adding he’s been talking with the lawyers regarding policy and what forces can legally do from an authorities standpoint — especially when it comes to questions on whether a service-retained capability can be used or an authority from higher levels of government should be used.

“Those are some of the learning points over the past year that we’ve looked at and talked about in trying to use the different processes, because NSA has a process for assignment and request, Cybercom has a process, the service and the joint force have a process,” Grass said. “Working through those, learning those, testing those out, have been some of the things that we’re learning and talking through now.”

Another pertinent command-and-control conundrum the team is pondering is the relationship between space and cyber forces. In the Marine Corps, those forces sit under the same commander — albeit technically belonging to Spacecom and Cybercom, respectively — but the coordination of those forces wasn’t done at the operational level or in some cases at the tactical level. They were planning or operating in silos and integration didn’t always happen.

“Earlier this week, we talked about an exercise that from across a variety of [the commander’s] hats, it kind of bubbled up that all these forces were providing support in a variety of shapes, forms or fashions — that they had been planning, doing great work forwarded support in a variety of different commands, but we hadn’t looked at it holistically across the commands,” Grass said.

Exercises to operations

Grass explained that last year was all about exercising MCIC, but in 2024, officials have been looking at focusing more on incorporating into operations.

In a recent real-world example, planning staff was sent to aid Marine Corps Forces Central Command as they are looking to support Centcom in the Israel-Hamas conflict. Given those planners weren’t organic to the MARCENT staff, MARFORCYBER/MCIC surged planners to help, though they weren’t directly involved in executing operations.

Augmenting staff in commands around the world is one critical element MCIC is looking to improve upon.

“What we’re looking to do is build out some capabilities to push forward in support of those MARFORs,” Grass said at the Modern Day Marine conference in April. “What we’re trying to do is build out contingents that can go out and augment those staffs with maybe some forward support or dedicated reach-back support to go out and do some staff augmentation.”

MCIC and all the other associated commands have Marines with specialties that don’t exist anywhere else, so sharing that elsewhere can help augment planning for unique operations.

“If you haven’t been assigned to Spacecom, if you haven’t been assigned to Cybercom, maybe you don’t know and understand some of the unique nuances of getting access to those authorities,” Grass said. “Trying to augment those staffs with folks from across that enterprise, whereas historically, the Marine Corps had been, ‘Hey, this is what we need to do on behalf of Cybercom, this is what we need to do on behalf of Spacecom.’ Trying to bring all those together on behalf of a particular MARFOR is an example I’m talking to right now.”

Visualizing the invisible information space

One of the biggest demand signals Grass is hearing from the larger community is the need for battlespace awareness in the information world.

“We generally have focused on battlespace awareness and creating a common operational picture of ground forces that maneuver around, and we’ve done the same thing for aviation resources that are moving around,” Grass said. “More and more there’s a demand signal for information environment battlespace awareness, both where are our forces physically — as we deploy them or as they are used in an exercise — but also where are they in cyberspace or in actual space? There’s an increasing demand signal from commanders and from organizations.”

Officials in the past have talked about the need for a common operational picture in the information space to be able to better visualize forces and effects and direct them much in the way that physical forces are commanded.

One of the things MCIC has been looking to provide is how to present the non-kinetic forces both offensively and defensively under a single commanding general to help Fleet Marine Force commanders understand what their capabilities are.

They’re also working on training, specifically modeling and simulation of the information space to better understand the effects of particular information capabilities or tools.

The effects of a munition, which have a predictable blast radius, are well known. However, the impact of using an information capability to affect the mind of a target is less understood.

“In the Marine Corps, breaking things and blowing things up has been our mantra for 200-plus years at this point. How do we in this new world where information is that much more important — it’s a force multiplier as we look at the Russia-Ukraine crisis, as we look at the Israel-Gaza crisis — how do we incorporate that into our training?” Grass said. “We as Marines trained on the rifle range every year. We train in the gas chamber every year. We do our physical fitness training to know and understand how we’ll do that in a real environment. The information environment [is] a little different, a lot more challenging, if you will, to train in.”

There has been work ongoing in collaboration with Twentynine Palms to better incorporate information into training and exercises.

“As we, across the Marine Corps, build out our information occupations in the weeks and months and years ahead and we build that capacity, how do we ensure that that’s incorporated into the training that we’ve done? How do we develop a range, an information range where you can test messages?” Grass said. “I would love to have a range where I could push [an] article out into a virtual training range ahead of time where there’s a population that’s been modeled to, [and] I can run a simulation so I can see the reaction to his article before it goes out into the wild, if you will. How can I put that into a simulation to see what impacts might or might not happen?”

Commanders and units have to be comfortable with and understand these types of capabilities before firing what Grass called “information bullets” into the battlespace.

“The information environment, battlespace awareness, we’re continuing to work on that and push that as we go forward, developing and maturing … finding processes and procedures that work, finding partners that want that information … that realize there’s a demand signal for that information,” Grass said. “Those are probably the three focus areas, I think, that we’ll be spending time and effort on over the next probably 12 months.”

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Activated last January, Marine Corps Information Command (MCIC) is designed to more tightly link the service’s information forces — including cyber, intelligence and space — in theater with the broader joint force. The need for a “common operational environment,” or COP, is essential for the organization to be successful in its remit to help leaders at all levels to be able to incorporate it into operations, as it is taking in activities from a variety of sources and forces.

“If information is a domain … you have to be able to see it, assess it, measure it, understand it, and where necessary shape and push it,” Maj. Gen. Ryan Heritage, commander of Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace and Marine Corps Forces Space Command, said in a December interview. “If you try to look at it in that context and know that the environment in which you’re operating is so dynamic that you’re going to have to have tools out there to measure or hopefully project changes in the environment before you’re even see them on the ground, before you’ve seen [them] physically, I think that will be invaluable to a future fight.”

 Heritage was tapped to be the next deputy commandant for information.

One of the key aspects of the MCIC, which Heritage also commands, is to bring in and leverage what tactical information forces are doing, such as the Marine Expeditionary Force Information Groups — also known as the MEF Information Groups or MIGs. These forces were created in 2017 and support each MEF within the Corps. They integrate electronic warfare with intelligence, communications, military information support operations, space, cyber and communication strategy — all to provide MEF commanders with an information advantage.

“What we’re trying to do here at the Marine Corps Information Command is leverage what the MIGs are seeing, reporting and assessing. How do we bring that into the command here and then … how do I create a common operational picture for the information environment?” Heritage said.

The organization is looking to use artificial intelligence and machine learning tools, he noted.

“Something beyond PowerPoint that captures things like narratives, how it’s changing and why is that important to the platoon commander, why is it important to the combatant commander — how do I display that … and then leveraging AI/ML, how do I show changes in that environment that either are going to provide an opportunity for us or the tactical unit or they’re going to provide some sort of indication and warning?” he said.

The Corps is considered by many experts to be the lead service on the adoption of information, both from a concept perspective and in terms of the forces it has developed and deployed.

In 2022, the Marines published Marine Corps Warfighting Publication-8, which aims to describe the purpose and mechanics of using information as a warfighting tool for the entire service.

“From all my walking around observations, I have seen nothing but acceptance of the tenets of MCDP-8 and the power of information,” Heritage said.

He also noted that the service’s culture is part of why the Marines have taken information so seriously.

“Part of it is culture. I would tie that to the Marine ethos, Marine culture and understanding how information is a key to warfighting and therefore every Marine a rifleman, every Marine needs to understand the power of information and where that’s applied and how they apply it,” he said.

“The creation of the MEF Information Groups — that has been around for years now. They have been, I think, incredibly valuable and they have been leading the way in the integration of various information-related capabilities. Then at the MARFOR level here recently, the establishment of the Marine Corps Information Command, we have just taken that at a different level and now you have under one commander, the ability to leverage authorities and capabilities from space, cyber, information operations and the cryptologic side,” he added.

Heritage explained that the MIGs get better with each operation and exercise, but they and the Corps are beyond the old adage of “sprinkling” information operations on top of an operation. It is integrated from the beginning.

One of the big lessons from their employment is the need for a common operational picture to display their environment.

“How do they present what they’re seeing in the information environment to the various commanders that they support in real time so that they can make the decision?” he said.

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The MCIC, activated in January 2023, is designed to more tightly link the service’s information forces — including cyber, intelligence and space — in theater with the broader joint force.

The organization is still at initial operational capability and is using a variety of exercises to build up its prowess and relationships.

“It grows with every exercise. Our ability to do it globally [is] not there. Trying to get [it] to regional, start with a couple exercises, and then really start to focus on a particular region and get good there and be able to pick up and pivot,” Maj. Gen. Ryan Heritage, commander of Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace and Marine Corps Forces Space Command, said in a December interview.

Heritage, who was selected to be the next deputy commandant for information, is also the head of the MCIC.

As the U.S. military gears up for potential conflicts with technologically sophisticated nation-states, it is imperative that capabilities from all domains — including the non-kinetic areas of cyberspace, space and the electromagnetic spectrum — are integrated. The Pentagon refers to this concept as “multi-domain operations.”

The MCIC was necessary, officials have stated, as a means of informing commanders about what types of capabilities — and in some cases, more importantly, authorities — exist for non-kinetic tools.

At the joint level, there are many authorities that have to be coordinated, especially in the non-kinetic and digital realms as it pertains to intelligence collection — which is very heavily regulated under spying authorities known as Title 50 — and operations within cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum meant to disrupt an adversary’s operations, known as Title 10 or general warfighting authorities.

The emphasis for maturing the MCIC has been on working with combatant commanders to understand the authorities and command relationships, starting with U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.

The goal, ideally, is to start at the planning process to work with relevant stakeholders so they know what types of forces to request and what forces must be readied to deploy in support.

Following those planning conferences, they then can talk about who has the authority to deploy. This could be remote support or forces that actually deploy as part of MARFORCYBER or MARFORSPACE.

“This goes to how do we mature as we grow. If we have folks that are working back here at the Fort [Meade in Maryland], they’ll have a different perspective and they’ll know where different expertise resides — as opposed to somebody who’s perhaps at the tactical level,” Heritage said. “How do we leverage, I’ll call them, interior lines that we have here at MARFORCYBER and the MCIC with other different organizations across the [intelligence community], interagency and [Department of Defense] when we deploy as part of a MCIC? Those relationships remain absolutely essential and again, those planners go with all that information into the conference.”

They are still working on what forces and authorities may deploy in practice.

“The intent is, we haven’t codified this in any fashion, but when you talk about multi-domain effects teams as a model which we’re looking at, is can you provide a multi-domain effects team under the various hats that I wear to either the fleet marine force or the joint force commander?” Heritage said. “If you can, what’s part of that multi-domain effects team? Space, [information operations], cyber, defensive cyber? Then whose authorities do they show up with geographic combatant commanders’ [areas of responsibility] and who do they leverage?”

The two main components of the MCIC include the Marine Corps Information Operations Center and the service’s cryptologic component.

Being a service-retained entity, as opposed to the cyber forces that the Marines and the other services provide to U.S. Cyber Command to conduct cyber operations, allows the MCIC to be part of the global force management process to attach certain forces and deploy them in support of a combatant command.

“It is not intuitive yet, which is why we’re trying to work it out one exercise at a time,” Heritage said, acknowledging they’ve “still got a ton of work to go.”

Some of that has manifested in attempting to support the objectives of various combatant commands — such as Indo-Pacom, Cybercom and Space Command — participating in a single exercise, all of which have their own milestones they need to hit.

“It’s small but it’s growing,” Heritage said of support to help each command meet their objectives.

Heritage noted there have been some “quick wins” with the MCIC and experimentation recently.

“We have been able to deploy Marines from all of our hats into exercises, bringing those authorities and walk those through the planning and execution phase in an exercise scenario,” he said.

Additionally, officials have begun working with Training and Education Command to take lessons and observations from exercises to instill at the Marine Air Ground Training Center at Twentynine Palms, California, to enable the all-domain training they provide for the rest of the Marine Corps.

“We’re integrated Training and Education Command’s initiatives on building service-level training events at Twentynine Palms,” Heritage said. “Now, Training and Education Command has another organization which they can reach up to and say, ‘We’re looking for your support from a [signals intelligence] perspective, from information operations, cyber and space. Help come down and enable the training there at Twentynine Palms for … [the forces] that flow through there on a regular basis.’”

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A revised version of Joint Publication 3-12 Cyberspace Operations — published in December 2022 and while unclassified, is only available to those with DoD common access cards, according to a Joint Staff spokesperson — officially provides a definition for “expeditionary cyberspace operations,” which are “[c]yberspace operations that require the deployment of cyberspace forces within the physical domains.”

DefenseScoop has seen a copy of the updated publication.

The last version was published in 2018 and was publicly available. The Joint Staff spokesman noted that five years has been the norm for updates.

The definition, recognition and discussion of such operations are indicative of not only the maturity of cyberspace and associated operations, but the need for more tactical capabilities to get at targets that the current cyber force might not be able to access.

U.S. Cyber Command owns the offensive cyber capabilities within DOD, and the services conduct offensive cyber ops through Cybercom and the cyber mission forces that each service provides to the command. Authorities to launch cyber effects have traditionally been held at the highest levels of government. In recent years, those authorities have been streamlined and delegated. However, most cyber operations are still conducted from remote locations by the cyber mission force (CMF) and primarily focused on IP-based networks.

Many of the services have begun investing in capabilities and forces for their own offensive cyber, however, that is mostly in the blended electronic warfare or radio frequency-enabled sphere at the tactical level.

The updated doctrine recognizes that these capabilities, which will still have to be coordinated centrally, could provide access to targets that remote operators might not be able to get for a variety of reasons.

“Developing access to targets in or through cyberspace follows a process that can often take significant time. In some cases, remote access is not possible or preferable, and close proximity may be required, using expeditionary [cyber operations],” the joint publication states. “Such operations are key to addressing the challenge of closed networks and other systems that are virtually isolated. Expeditionary CO are often more regionally and tactically focused and can include units of the CMF or special operations forces … If direct access to the target is unavailable or undesired, sometimes a similar or partial effect can be created by indirect access using a related target that has higher-order effects on the desired target.”

It also notes that these effects and operations should be coordinated with the intelligence community to deconflict intelligence gain/loss.

Moreover, the updated doctrine recognizes the complexity of cyberspace and how in-demand cyber capabilities might be. Thus, global cyber support might need to “reach-forward” to support multiple combatant commands simultaneously.

“Allowing them to support [combatant commands] in this way permits faster adaptation to rapidly changing needs and allows threats that initially manifest only in one [area of responsibility] to be mitigated globally in near real time. Likewise, while synchronizing CO missions related to achieving [combatant commander] objectives, some cyberspace capabilities that support this activity may need to be forward-deployed; used in multiple AORs simultaneously; or, for speed in time-critical situations, made available via reachback,” it states. “This might involve augmentation or deployment of cyberspace capabilities to forces already forward or require expeditionary CO by deployment of a fully equipped team of personnel and capabilities.”

When it comes to internalizing the new doctrine, the Air Force sees this as additional access points for operations.

“How do we leverage folks that are and forces that are at the tactical edge for access? That’s primarily how I think about the expeditionary capabilities we have … is empowering or enabling the effect they’re trying to create or using their access or position physically, to help enable some of our effects,” Lt. Gen. Kevin Kennedy, commander of 16^th Air Force/Air Forces Cyber, told DefenseScoop at the AFCEA TechNet Cyber conference.

He noted that these access-enabling capabilities could be across the services, but primarily from an Air Force perspective, “I’m looking at looking within the Air Force, from aerial platforms down to ground-based airmen, as well about how we would do that,” he said.

Officials have described how the services are seeking to build their own forces separate from Cybercom.

“There was a lot of language that came out the [National Defense Authorization Act] that talked about force design in general. All the services to one degree or another are really — I’m not going to say rethinking — but evaluating what their contribution to the joint force is, as well as what their own … service-retained cyber teams are,” Chris Cleary, principal cyber advisor for the Department of Navy, told DefenseScoop at the AFCEA conference.

Last year’s NDAA directed the Pentagon to develop a strategy for converged cyber and electronic warfare conducted by deployed military and intelligence assets, specifically for service-retained assets.

As electronic warfare and cyber capabilities are expected to be a big part of the battlefield in 2030 — a key waypoint the Army has been building toward — it recognizes those capabilities can’t be held from remote sanctuary, Maj. Gen. Paul Stanton, commander of the Army Cyber Center of Excellence, told DefenseScoop in an interview on the sidelines of the AFCEA conference.

In fact, the Army’s principal cyber adviser has tasked the Cyber Center of Excellence with clarifying certain authorities and capabilities.

“How do you execute electronic attack to achieve effects? How do you differentiate a cyber-delivered capability that benefits from proximity based on owning the land, owning the ground?Because that’s what the Army does. The principal cyber advisor, Dr. [Michael] Sulmeyer is tasking me with conducting a study to clearly define and delineate where those lines are,” Stanton said. “This study is going to help us be able to clearly define that. I expect to be tasked to kick that off here in the very near future with about 90 days to complete.”

When it comes to service-retained forces and capabilities, the Army has built the 11^th Cyber Battalion, formerly the 915^th Cyber Warfare Battalion, which provides tactical, on-the-ground cyber operations — mostly through radio-frequency effects — electronic warfare and information ops. The unit will help plan tactical operations for commanders and conduct missions in coordination with deployed forces. It consists of several expeditionary cyber and electromagnetic activities (CEMA) teams that are scalable and will maneuver with units and conduct operations on the ground for commanders.

The Navy, meanwhile, is building what it’s calling non-kinetic effects teams, which will augment afloat forces with critical information warfare capabilities. Cleary has previously noted that the service is still working through what cyber ops at sea will look like.

“As we continue to professionalize this, [information warfare commanders within carrier strike groups] will become more and more important as it fully combines all aspects of the information warfare space, the electromagnetic spectrum, command and control of networks, eventually potentially offensive cyber being delivered from sea, information operations campaigns,” Cleary said.

“That job will mature over time, and then the trick is to get the Navy and the Marine Corps to work together because we are back to our roots of being an expeditionary force. Even the Marines through [Commandant] Gen. [David] Berger’s new force design is really about getting the Marines back to being what the Marines were designed to be, which is an expeditionary fighting force that goes to sea with the Navy. We work together to achieve our objectives as a team, and we’re getting back to our blocking [and] tackling them.”

For the Marine Corps’ part, officials have been building Marine Expeditionary Force Information Groups (MIGs), which were created in 2017 and support each MEF within the Corps, integrate electronic warfare with intelligence, communications, military information support operations, space, cyber and communication strategy — all to provide MEF commanders with an information advantage.

The service has also recently established Marine Corps Information Command (MCIC), which was designed to more tightly link the service’s information forces — including cyber, intelligence and space — in theater with the broader joint force across the globe.

Mission elements the Marines have created and sent forward with Marine expeditionary units are “right in line with [Joint Publication] 3-12,” Maj. Gen. Joseph Matos, deputy commander of Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command, told DefenseScoop at the AFCEA conference.

“How do we take what we do at the fort, or back at Fort Meade [where Cybercom is headquartered], and be able to extend that out to the services? That’s what we’re in the process of doing right now … We started about two years ago doing that. That capability is starting to mature pretty well,” he said. “It’s to extend Cyber Command out to those forward units.”

Matos said the recently created MCIC will act as the integrator for a lot of these capabilities throughout the force, acting as a bridge of sorts.

The organization will help tactical forces understand the authorities and capabilities that cyber can provide to help them conduct their missions.

“You kind of hit a glass ceiling of the capability [of] the lower elements being able to reach out and do cyberspace operations,” Matos said of the process prior to establishing that entity. “We’re able to say, OK, here’s a team, trained, capable,’ understand the capabilities that we can bring, give them to the deployed forces to say, ‘OK, you want to do cyber operations, here’s how we can help you do that.’ We know who to talk to, the authorities and so on so forth, and we can do that. I think it’s right in line with what the [Joint Publication] 3-12 is trying to do.”

That command essentially acts as the glue between the high-end cyber forces and the tactical elements, bridging the gap between Cybercom forces and the deployed forces.

“The genesis of the Marine Corps Information Command to tie all these elements together is to address that concern, is to be that integration point between the forces below the tactical edge who have these requirements to operate in a rapidly changing environment. But also tie that to the Marine Corps Information Command knows who to talk to at Cyber Command, or at NSA, or at Space Command. To be able to be that touchpoint between the two organizations so you don’t have to have an infantry battalion going all the way to” a combatant command, Matos said during a presentation at the AFCEA conference.

“I think as we operate in this rapidly changing cyberspace world, that Marine Corps Information Command’s going to be a tremendous benefit to the [Marine Air Ground Task Force], but also to the joint world and the intelligence and cyber world,” he added.

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The Corps intends to create a Marine Corps Information Command (MCIC), according to the annual update to Gen. David Berger’s Force Design 2030, released Monday.

Given the global nature of the information environment, the Corps believes it will need to better link its tactically focused forces and capabilities in theater with other military units across theaters.

“We believe that in a conflict with a peer adversary, first moves may be in space and cyber, so we must enable our Stand-in Forces, MEUs, and MEFs to integrate with, and have access to, those capabilities now,” the document says, referencing Marine expeditionary units and expeditionary forces.

This new command will streamline and coordinate authorities for forces as well as requirements in theater, according to Lt. Gen. Matthew Glavy, deputy commandant for information.

“The Marine Corps as a stand-in force, based on its ability to maneuver, based on its placement and access has game here,” he said during a presentation at the Modern Day Marine conference on Wednesday. “There’s opportunity for the Marine Corps to enable the joint force in such a way to gain advantage. This idea of the MCIC is trying to streamline.”

At the joint level, there are a lot of authorities that have to be coordinated, especially in the non-kinetic and digital realm as it pertains to intelligence collection — which is very heavily regulated under spying authorities known as Title 50 — and operations within cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum meant to disrupt an adversaries operations, known as Title 10 or general warfighting authorities.

In many cases, the lines between these disciplines can be blurred given how closely related their actions are.

Unlike in Hollywood, cyberspace operations or operations in the electromagnetic spectrum aren’t as easy as pushing “Enter” on keyboard, In order to be successful in these highly technical operations, forces must be forward and present to gain the necessary access for intelligence collection to map and understand systems and signals, and eventually affect systems if the go-ahead is given.

“If you’re not touching, integrating, intimate in those authorities, you’ll be left out. The idea of this MCIC is … taking advantage of all that in order to provide the depth and breadth to be this enabler of the joint force out on the edge based on where we are living in the weapons engagement zone,” Glavy said. “If you’re not where those authorities are — like space, like cyber, like the intel community, Title 50 authorities — if you’re not there you’re probably going to be hard pressed to get there.”

The Force Design document notes that the Corps has learned that access and placement matter and assigning liaison officers within naval, joint and combined organizations with authorities and permissions will allow them to gain kill web tempo and agility.

“We can streamline and simplify much of the coordination burden at the headquarters level if we re-organize and re-focus some of our structure, which we will do in the future with the creation of the Marine Corps Information Command,” the document says.

Glavy clarified to FedScoop following his remarks that this command, which is still pre-decisional, will help to coordinate these intelligence and warfighting capabilities across the Marine Corps’ tactical formations and gain symmetry with the joint force.

It will also facilitate requirements the MEFs may have that fall outside the scope of their specific combatant commands, he added.

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